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Introduction
The study and discussion of the role and effects of user fees for publicly provided health services, especially in developing countries, has evolved during the last decades. During the 1980s and 1990s, health sector reforms to improve the efficiency of health systems and the quality of care provided were implemented in low-income countries, mainly in Africa (kilde) However, the introduction of user fees seems to had had the unintended effect of decreasing access to health care by the poor and is further accused of greatly contributed to increasing the exposure of poor households to the financial risks associated with illness (kilde).

In Western wealthy countries, out-of-pocket payments for health care services have increased as well, as the cost of health care has risen. While the need for increased quality in health care constituted the main argument for health reforms and the introduction of user fees in developing countries, these so-called out-of-pocket-payments are introduced in Western wealthy countries for other reasons. Traditionally we find two main arguments for introducing user fees; user fees as a supplementary tax to finance the public sector, and user fees as a means to manage and regulate the citizens’ behaviour (Hansen & Keiding 1991). Hansen & Keiding argues that user fees have to be introduced with the purpose of regulating unwanted behaviour, and that the user fee has to be at exact the level that makes the citizens consider his or her behaviour (Hansen & Keiding 1991:16). Economic arguments in favour of higher out-op-pocket expenses suggest that people make better and more cost-effective health care decisions when they pay for health services at the time their receive these services and when the amount they pay is related to the cost of these services. In the Danish welfare state user fees are suggested, mainly to regulate an asserted over-use of the health system.

The need for increasing the quality of the health system is not an issue in the user fee debate in the Western countries, but why should the effects, such as an increase in social inequality in access to health care be different, just because of a different purpose? The effects of introducing user fees in wealthy countries will of course not be as catastrophic and comprehensive as experienced in several developing countries, but the effects of out-of-pocket expenses on certain groups such as low-income persons, the elderly, and the chronically ill, must be considered. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the relatively new discussion about user fees and other forms of privatisations of public welfare, by discussing user fees in the health sector and consequences for inequality in access to health care. The paper will be comprised of three parts; firstly a theoretical discussion of the consequences of increased privatisation of social welfare; secondly the financing of the health sector in OECD countries will be mapped and thirdly, social inequality in the use of health care with and without user fees will be discussed in the light of Danish data.

Private provision of social welfare – the theoretical discussions
Changes in public provision and financing of welfare responsibilities have become rather common in recent discussions of challenges to the welfare states (Adema, Adema & Einerhand, Gilbert). Some believe that public welfare to a large intent will be crowded out in the future, and it might even be argued that such developments are necessary or at least desirable in order to cope with future economic challenges of the welfare state like ageing populations, globalization - or with changing values and changing expectations like individualisation (+ igen: argumentet om, at offentlig, universel velfærdsydelser skaber et overforbrug og at indførelse af brugerbetaling vil bidrage til at regulere denne uhensigtsmæssige adfærd). Others would see such a development as an attack on the core values of the welfare state; in particular, this would install new dynamics of change driven by discursive change and decline of solidarity on the one hand, and by changing interest groups and power relations on the other. For instance, private companies might gain a bridgehead from which they could conquer the welfare state, and groups with strong social resources would lose interest in collective arrangements of the state. So far, however, this discussion remains largely speculative, and the research-based knowledge is quite limited.

Policies of privatisation and new welfare mix can be introduced to serve several purposes, but efficiency and increased productivity, or a financial relief of the welfare state via reduction of the public responsibilities, have typically appeared as the main purpose (Sanger). In the Danish case, cost containment is clearly a dominant motive among politicians, but, as mentioned, in the case of user fees, regulation of unwanted behaviour is a primary motive.

In the sparing literature about the consequences of privatisations, we observe quite different overall arguments. According one argument, changes in mix will not necessary have any consequences. Overbye (1998) is, of the opinion that different structures or institutions very well can produce functional equivalent outcomes, and the question will rather be how much change the welfare can state ‘take’, before it will have consequences and effect outcome? But, as pointed out by Gilbert (2002) among others, the same total level of expenditure to welfare, but with different mix between public and private, is very likely to cause different outcome as well. In his example, Gilbert uses OECD-numbers for Denmark and the US respectively, where the total welfare expenditure as percent of GDP are practically alike (see also Adema & Einerhand 1998, Adema 1999, 2002, 2005), but the differences in welfare mix result in widely different outcomes in the shape of inequality, polarisation and solidarity (Gilbert 2002).

It is exactly observations like the latter that constitute the reason why mainstream welfare literature take point of departure in social rights and often consider private provision of welfare – social security and service – as a ‘welfare replacement’ that just carry on the market inequality and more or less can remain invisible, when the welfare state are discussed (Korpi 2002). A crowding in of private welfare is per definition tantamount to crowding out welfare. But private welfare is far from an unambiguous concept, and the existing knowledge about the consequences of changing welfare mix is utmost inadequate. 

Privatisations are often at blame for increasing economic inequality, even though it may be more economic effective. User fees in specific will increase inequality in access to the kind of welfare service, which have to be paid for directly, and in case of the health sector, this might have serious consequences for social variations in health.


The potential impact of how health systems are financed on the wellbeing of households, particularly poor households, has affected the design of health systems and insurance mechanisms in many countries (Bovbjerg 2001). The protecting of people from very high payments is widely accepted as a desirable objective of health policy (Musgrove 2000, WHO 2000, WHO 2001). High health expenditure is not always synonymous with high health-care costs. A large bill for surgery, for example, might not be catastrophic if a household does not bear the full cost because the service is provided free or at a subsidised price, or is covered by third-party insurance. On the other hand, even small costs for common illnesses can be financially disastrous for poor households.

Little, however, is known about which health system characteristics protect households from catastrophic payments, and the impact of out-of-pocket payments on social inequality in access to health care.

Determinants of health inequality
Focussing on the dependent variable, inequality in health, we might ask what causes health inequality in the first place, and whether the introduction of user fees is expected to increase the inequality in access to health care. In theory, we find five main determinants or explanations of inequality in health:
1.	Material explanations: differences in income affect food habits, living conditions etc.
2.	Cultural explanations: different norms and values affect attitudes toward smoking, exercise etc.
3.	Social-psychological explanations: support from family, friends and colleagues (mostly regarding mental health)
4.	Life-course explanations: health and social factors affect each other
5.	Political-economic explanations: political processes and power relations affect the amount of service, the degree of environmental improvement policies ect.

[To be elaborated on]

Introduction of user fees in the health sector will in this paper be seen as a political-economic factor.



User fees in the health sector in OECD countries
User fees in the health sector is not a new concept in most OECD countries. Countries like Australia, France and Finland have financed relatively large parts (36%, 30% and 44% in 1960) of the total expenditure on health by user fees from the beginning of the 1960’s, and even a classified universalistic welfare state like Denmark financed 15% of the total expenditure on health in 1973 by user fees (OECD Health Division).

Table 1 below shows health expenditure by source of financing, and the variations clearly appear. However, the variations are not following the classic distinction between types of welfare regimes as we might have expected. 


Table 1. Health expenditure by source of financing, 2003, Percentage of total health expenditure, ranged by level of out-of-pocket payments
	Public expenditure on health	Out-of-pocket payments	Private health insurance	All other private funds
Mexico	44.1	52.9	3.0	
Korea	51.9	38.4	3.6	6.1
Switzerland	58.5	31.6	9.0	1.0
Poland	69.9	26.4	0.6	2.6
Hungary	71.3	24.1	0.6	4.0
Spain	70.3	23.6	5.4	0.7
Italy	74.7	22.4	0.9	2.0
Belgium	71.6	22.2	4.9	1.4
Portugal	73.4	21.0	4.1	1.5
Turkey	71.6	19.9		8.6
Australia	67.5	19.7	7.2	5.6
Finland	76.2	19.4	2.4	2.0
Iceland	82.5	17.5	0.0	
Japan	81.5	17.4	0.3	0.8
Austria	75.3	17.1	4.9	2.7
New Zealand	78.3	15.6	5.8	0.3
Norway	83.7	15.5		0.8
Canada	70.2	14.5	12.7	2.6
Denmark	84.2	14.2	1.5	0.1
Ireland	76.7	14.2	6.5	2.6
United States	44.5	13.6	36.5	5.4
Germany	78.7	11.8	8.7	0.8
Slovak Republic	88.3	11.7		
Czech Republic	89.8	10.0	0.2	0.0
Netherlands		7.8	17.8	6.3
France	79.4	7.3	12.5	0.8
Luxembourg	90.6	6.7	1.7	1.0
Note: Out-of-pocket payments in this table = user fees
Source: OECD Health Data 2007

[more about the table in here…]


Poorer health status where user fees?
According to the dominating theoretical argument presenting above, we will expect a generally poorer health status in countries with a high level of user fees than in countries without or with a small level of user fees. To put the argument simple, a high level of user fees will prevent the poorest citizens from using the health care system. The higher level of user fees the more citizens are prevented from the service and the lover aggregated health status.

In the following this hypothesis is examined by use of two indicators for health status: one general and so-called objective measure, life expectancy at birth in the countries, and one more subjective measure, the citizens own perceived health status.


Life expectancy
Life expectancy is the most general and best known measure of the health status of a population. Changes in life expectancy are traditionally linked to different interdependent variables such as lifestyles, living standards, and access to quality health services (OECD: Society at a Glance 2005). Increasing inequality in access to health service therefore is expected to be followed by increasing inequality in life expectancy.








Table 2: Life expectancy at birth, in years, in 2003


Source: OECD Health Division


As shown in table 2, life expectancy varies enormously among OECD countries. In Turkey men can expect to live for 66.2 years, while they are predicted to live for 78.5 years in Iceland. The same difference goes for women; here life expectance is lowest in Turkey with 70.9 years and highest in Japan with 85.2 years. Average for all OECD countries is 74.7 for men and 80.6 for women.

If we compare these life expectancy data with the ranking in table 1, our first expectation is to find correlation between the amount of user fees in the country and life expectancy rate among the population. However, we find quite a different picture.

Figure 1: % user fees in the health sector and life expectancy in OECD countries, 2003















Note: % user fees: percentage of total health expenditure
Life expectancy: life expectancy at birth in years
Source: OECD health division



[Detailed comments to the figure in here]


Perceived health status
Using another indicator for health, the citizens own subjective perceived health status, the overall picture of no correlation seems intact. However, as the data does not allow us to test the actual correlation coefficient or the level of significance, the real correlation might be underestimated. Nevertheless, the expected strong relationship between the variables is clearly absent. 


Figure 2: % user fees in the health sector and perceived health status in OECD countries
















Note: Perceived health status: % citizens in country surveys considering their health status as ‘good’ or ‘very good’
For Canada, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States, data are from 2003
For Australia, Belgium, France, Iceland, Japan, Luxembourg and Poland, data are from 2004
For Czech Republic, Korea, Norway and Portugal, data are from 2005
Data are not available for Switzerland and Austria.
Source: OECD Health Division


[Detailed comments to the figure in here]

User fees and social inequality in health within the Danish welfare state
These results are quite surprising, however, the overall focus in this paper was not so much the discussion about, whether or not user fees decreases the general health status in a given country, but rather to discuss, whether the social inequality in health is affected negatively by introducing user fees. 

Compared with other OECD countries, quite a large part of the total national spending on health issues, are paid for purely by the private individuals. Expenditures for medicine and dental care constitute the largest part, but the Danish citizens also have to pay for glasses and physiotherapy by themselves.

For the perfect analysis we would need longitudinal data for this. Since such data are not available, we compare social inequality in health in an area exposed to user fees with social inequality not exposed to user fees. More precisely we use data only for Denmark, and compare social inequality in visiting a dentist, which is an area with a very high level of user fees (about 2/3 of the costs have to be paid directly by the citizen), with social inequality in visiting a doctor (GP), which is free of charge, and paid for through the taxes.


Table 3: Average number of visits to GP and Dentist, categorised by socio-economic status, 2006
	GP	Dentist	N
Self-employed	5.7	1.1	187715
Assisting spouse	6.6	1.3	7810
Chief executives	4.9	1.3	69840
Employed with high income	5.1	1.2	329912
Employed with middle income	6.1	1.2	455492
Employed with lower income	6.1	1.1	1025647
Unemployed	7.5	0.8	107734
Pensioners and early retired	12.7	1.0	1094259
Others outside the labour market	5.1	0.4	1372148
Notes: definitioner på kategorierne, jf. DST
Source: Statistics Denmark


However the expected variations seems not to be the case – looking at the citizens’ amount of visiting the doctor, pensioners and early retired are not surprisingly visiting their doctor quite more often than the other groups. But also the unemployed seem to have a health status that requires the doctors help more often than others. Chief executives, employed with high income and ‘others outside the labour market’ (mainly students) visit the doctor the least, indicating the best health status among these groups.

Turning to dental care we find quite the opposite picture: pensioners and early retired people see their dentist the least, while chief executives and employed with high incomes visit the dentist the most.

[More about this in here]

Why effect locally but not aggregate?
My data does not allow me to go deeper into the discussion about social inequality in health related to specific areas within other countries but Denmark, but based on these preliminary analysis and the theoretical discussions, I expect to find an explanation in the organisation of the ‘user fee policy’. In Denmark the user fees are limited to quite few areas – mainly dental work, glasses and physiotherapy.

[Discussion about the effect of other factors than the socio-economic in here]


Conclusions
The main question in this paper; whether user fees in the health sector will increase social inequality in health is somehow misleading, because the lack of longitudinal data that would be needed to conclude about consequences of a change of policy.

However, by comparing different areas within the Danish welfare state, dental care with a high degree of user fees and regular doctors (GP) with no user fees at all, we get a picture of the social differences anyway. 

As long as the country keep a comprehensive public health sector with large degree of coverage for its citizens, I tend to agree with Overby saying that the introduction of different kinds of welfare mix might as well produce functional equivalent outcomes. The social inequality in health is not necessarily increasing because of an increase in the level of user fees. However, it is not of no consequence how the user fee policy is organised.

As mentioned in the introduction, user fees should not be introduced purely for the money – but it is mainly a means for management and should only be used where the desire is influence the behaviour of the users. In the health care debates in Denmark about user fees, an argument goes that some people tend to over-use the GP’s and therefore introduction of a new small user fee is suggested. According to the theoretical debates and the sparse empirical analysis in this paper this properly won’t increase the social inequality….
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